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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
similar attitude, but exercising its prerogative of firing 4
or locking-out" those engaged in the harassment, or ap-
plying counter-harassment tactics,56 the collective bargain-
ing required by Insurance Agents' Union would be met.
In such a situation the tactics used outside the conference
room would not preclude a sincere desire to reach agree-
ment at the bargaining table. The statutory requirement of
good faith demands no more.
M. ALBERT FIGiNsKI
Distribution To "Issue"
Clarke v. Clarke'
Testator by will, which was probated in 1913, left his
estate in trust for his son Ernest Clarke for life and
"from and after the death of my son * * * then to his
issue, absolutely."2 Ernest Clarke died in 1958 and was
survived by two sons: Thomas with no children, and
Robert Fulton with one child - Robert Fulton Clarke, Jr.,
an infant.' When the trust estate was ready for dis-
- 361 U.S. 477, 492-95 (1961). The firing of the employees engaged in
unprotected activities as an alternative to seeking a cease and desist
order on a charge of unfair labor practice, as was attempted without
success in the principal case, may be a self-defeating and unusuable sub-
stitute, especially where the employees involved are skilled tradesmen,
who would be difficult to replace if fired, or where the employees in the
field are highly organized and would not accept the job opened by a
firing arising out of a labor dispute.
1N.L.R.B. v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 92 (1957), found that
an employer lockout was not per se unlawful, and was under the facts of
that case a legitimate employer weapon.
9 A possible argument for a parity of economic weapons is provided by
the legislative intent of Taft-Hartley which aimed at erasing the "one-
sided" character of bargaining that existed under the Wagner Act. S. Rep.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1946). However, management would have
to take care not to commit a per se unfair labor practice by unilaterally
changing working conditions. Supra, circa n. 22.
The separate opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter urged:
"... interpretations of the Act ought not to proceed on the assumption
that it actively throws its weight on the side of unionism in order
to redress an assumed inequality of bargaining power." 360 U.S. 477,
507 (1960).
'222 Md. 153, 159 A. 2d 362 (1960).
'Id., 155.
'In 1950, while the life tenant was still living, the infant by his mother
(the divorced wife of Robert Fulton Clarke), brought suit for a declara-
tion of his interest in the trust, for an 'accounting by the trustee and
for protection against dissipation of the estate. The court held that
"issue" meant all descendants and the infant had a potential future
Interest in the corpus but all other questions including distribution were
"reserved for future determination as the need may arise." See In re
Clarke's Will, 198 Md. 266, 274, 81 A. 2d 640 (1951).
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tribution, Robert Fulton, Clarke, Jr., claimed that he was
entitled to share the estate equally and concurrently with
his uncle and father. The chancellor held that the uncle
and father took in equal shares to the exclusion of the
infant because the testator had used "issue" as the equiva-
lent of "children." Robert Fulton Clarke, Jr., appealed.
On appeal all parties agreed that "issue" was used as
a word of purchase,4 indicating the class who would take at
the death of the life tenant, and that no evidence of the
testator's intent by the use of the word "issue" could be
found in the will or in the evidence.' The Court of Appeals
accepted the infant appellant's contention that the word
"issue" was used by the testator to mean "descendants,"6
but held that the descendants of different generations did
not take equally; the younger generation took only as
representatives of deceased ancestors, and therefore a child
could not compete with a living parent. The Court ex-
pressly adopted the rule of the Restatement of Property
that:
"When a conveyance creates a class gift by a limi-
tation in favor of a group described as the 'issue of B,'
or as the 'descendants of B' . . . then, unless a contrary
intent . . . is found . . .distribution is made to such
members of the class as would take, and in such shares
as they would receive, under the applicable law of
intestate succession if B had died intestate. . .. "I
The appellant argued that the case was controlled by
the English rule that descendants of whatever generation
take per capita, which he claimed the Maryland cases long
ago made the law of the State. This position was sus-
tained by Judge Prescott in a dissent in which Judge
Homey concurred. The reasoning of the dissent was that
the English rule of construction, that a gift to "de-
'222 Md. 153, 156. The Rule in Shelley's case would not apply because
the will was executed after the abolition of the Rule by MD. LAWS 1912.
Ch. 144, 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 366. Furthermore, the estate of the
life tenant was equitable while those of the remaindermen were legal;
it is fundamental that for the Rule to apply both the estate of the life
tenant and the remainderman must be of the same quality. Cowman
v. Classen, 156 Md. 428, 435-36, 144 A. 367 (1929).
Supra, n. 1, 157.
Id., 157. It is well estarblished in Maryland and by the weight of
authority in this country that issue embraces all lineal descendants.
For the rule in other jurisdictions see annotations in 2 A.L.R. 930 (1919),
5 A.L.R. 195 (1920) and 117 A.L.R. 692 (1938).
7Id., 157-158. See 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 303. The Restate-
ment Rule is also called the Massachusetts Rule.
1961]
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scendants" simply is distributed per capita, was well es-
tablished in Maryland and encompassed the instant case,'
notwithstanding the fact that this meant a child would
share equally with a living parent. Judge Prescott ac-
knowledged that the Restatement rule might be the better
one, but stated that if it was desirable to reverse the rule
in Maryland the appropriate agency to do so was the
Legislature and not the Courts.'
Judge Hammond, for the Court, did not deny that the
English rule had been applied in Maryland. Instead, he
maintained that the rule was not binding in the instant
situation because the basis of the decision in each case
which had referred to the English rule had been the intent
of the conveyor as disclosed by the instrument."0 On the
other hand, the cases cited by Judge Hammond as ap-
proving the Restatement rule do not enlist the rule in the
context of a case where a child was competing with a
living parent for a share of a class gift and the intention of
the conveyor was not apparent." Thus, in Henderson v.
Henderson 2 and Thomas v. Safe-Dep. & Tr. Co., 3 there
was no contest between, a child and a living parent; in
Mazziotte v. Safe-Dep. & Tr. Co.' 4 the testator directed that
the trust be distributed per capita; and in Patchell v.
Groom,5 Ballenger v. McMillan,' and Robinson v. Mercan-
tile,' the testator directed that the gift was to be distrib-
uted "per stirpes and not per capita." The latter two cases,
with Mazziotte v. Safe-Dep. & Tr. Co., were cited by Judge
8 Id., 168-172.
1 In 1921 New York enacted the following statute: "If a person dying
after this section takes effect shall devise or bequeath any present or
future interest in real or personal property to the Issue of himself or
another, such Issue shall, if in equal degree of consanquinity to their
common ancestor, take per capita, but if in unequal degree, per stirpes,
unless a contrary intent is expressed in the will." 13 McKINNIY's CoNs.
LAWS oF N.Y. ANN. (1949), .§ 47-a.
10 In McPherson v. Snowden, 19 Md. 197 (1862), a concession was made
that "issue" meant "children"; in Alexander v. Keplinger, 62 Md. 7
(1884), the will directed the distribution of the corpus "equally" and
"share and share alike" among the issue; in Levering v. Orrick, 97 Md.
139, 54 A. 620 (1903), the will expressly lordered a per capita distribu-
tion among the descendants; and in Requardt v. Safe Deposit Co., 143 Md.
431, 122 A. 526 (1923), the will declared that the "corpus be divided
equally among their surviving children."
11 See dissent, 222 Md. 153, 174-175, 159 A. 2d 362 (1960).
"2 64 Md. 185, 1 A. 72 (1885).
73 Md. 451, 21 A. 367 (1891).
"180 Md. 48, 23 A. 2d 4 (1941).
185 Md. 10, 43 A. 2d 32 (1945).
16205 Md. 94, 106 A. 2d 109 (1954).
17 214 Md. 30, 132 A. 2d 841 (1957).
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Hammond as indicating "approval of the Restatement
rule ... at least implicitly. 18
The cases cited merely beg the question. The real
reason behind the Court's adoption of the Restatement
rule, apparently, is that the rationale of the English cases
which form the basis of the English rule is anachronistic.
When the English rule gained its vogue the share of a
member of a class who died before the testator passed to
the other members of the class and not to his heirs or legal
representatives. 19 As pointed out by Professor Page:
"The courts felt that they had no choice between per-
mitting grandchildren to share equally with their
parents and excluding them entirely, although they
conceded that testator probably intended grand-
children whose parents were dead to take their par-
ents' shares, and grandchildren whose parents were
alive, to take nothing. Being unable to give effect to
testator's entire intention they preferred not to dis-
inherit the grandchildren whose parents had died be-
fore testator, even at the expense of permitting the
other grandchildren to take equally with their par-
ents.
'20
Today statutes preventing the lapse obviate this result.
2 1
Now the courts by restricting "issue" to the first generation
and distributing per capita, with representation if any of
the first generation have died after the will was made and
before the testator died, can "reach the result the English
courts wished to reach but could not. '22 And the current
trend, as observed by both the Court and the dissent, is
in favor of the Restatement rule.23
18 Supra, n. 11, 164.
1 9 Ibid.
2'Id., 164-165, quoting 3.PAGE, WLLs, (Lifetime ed. 1941) § 1079.21In Maryland see 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 355.
"222 Md. 153, 165, 159 A. 2d 362 (1960), quoting 3 PAGE, WiLs
(Lifetime ed. 1941) § 1079.
2Id., 165, 176. In England the rule of the Restatement was adopted
as early as 1856. In Robinson v. Sykes, 23 Beav. 40, 53 Eng. Rep. 16
(Rolls Ct. 1856), by a settlement, a trust fund was settled after the
death of the husband and wife upon the children equally who should sur-
vive them. The trust provided if any child should die in the life of the
husband and wife, and leaving "issue" then living, his share should go
equally between the issue of such child, when and at such time as the
respective shares of such child would have become due and payable.
Held, -that the "issue" of such "children" took per stirpes, and that the
successive generations of "issue" took their respective shares by sub-
stitution, and not concurrently, so that grandchildren and great grand-
children could not take together as a class. See 34 HALSBURY'S LAWS
OF ENGLAND (3rd ed. 190) § 1070.
19611
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The dissent is an accurate recapitulation of the Mary-
land cases that have involved gifts to "issue" or "de-
scendants." But, as pointed out by the majority opinion,
in each Maryland decision in which the English rule was
cited the conveyor disclosed his intention in the instru-
ment,24 and hence it was unnecessary for the Court to
resort to a rule of construction to determine how the gift
was to be distributed. It would seem then that the Clarke
case presented the first instance where the English rule -
that bequests to descendants simply are distributed per
capita unless a contrary intent appears25 - could have been
properly invoked. Thus the Court was not bound by any
prior decision, and its adoption of the Restatement rule
was the better one because the reasons for the English
rule, as stated by Professor Page, no longer existed.
It is submitted, however, that the English rule is ob-
solete for another reason in addition to the explanation
offered by Professor Page. This other reason is that the
rule was employed by the English courts for the purpose
of creating joint tenancies, thus manifesting the common
law presumption of joint tenancies.26 In the leading Eng-
lish case of Davenport v. Hanbury,27 involving the con-
struction of the word "issue," the gift was to "Mary
Davenport or her issue."2 Mary Davenport died in the
life of the testator leaving one child living, a son, and two
grandchildren, the children of a deceased daughter. There
were two questions: (1) whether the grandchildren were
entitled with the son; and, if so, (2) whether they should
take per capita or per .stirpes29 The Master of the Rolls
held that "issue" included the grandchildren; and as there
were "no words of severance," 0nor anything to show that
the testator intended a per stirpes distribution, the son
and the children of the deceased daughter would take per
capita as joint tenants." A per stirpes distribution would
not have excluded the grandchildren but it would have
created a tenancy in common because the respective in-
terests of the parties would not have been equal; the son
Supra, n. 10.
5 See Levering v. Orrick, 97 Md. 139, 145, 54 A. 620 (1903).
212 TIFFANY, REAL PRopETY (3rd ed. 1939) § 421. The common law
favored joint tenancies because it lessened the feudal burdens of the
tenants since only one suit and service was due from all the joint tenants.
'3 Ves. Jr. 257, 30 Eng. Rep. 999 (Ch. 1796).
Id., 257.
Ibid.
Id., 260.
Si Ibid.
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would have received one-half the estate and the grand-
children one-fourth of the estate each.2
The common law preference for joint tenancies which
prompted the result of the Davenport case no longer pre-
vails. Today, in fact, the courts do not favor joint tenan-
cies." In the Clarke case it would have been incongruous
for the Court to have used a rule of construction which was
formulated for the purpose of reaching a tenancy which
the law no longer favors. It is more important for the
courts to consider that when a testator uses "issue" or
"descendants" without qualification, he almost certainly
has no idea of the legal consequences which are wrought
by his failure to use per stirpes or per capita, or words
which have been held by the courts to have like effect.34
The average testator probably would prefer his more
immediate descendants to share in his estate in the same
manner as prescribed by the statutes of descent, and he
probably would think it fairer to have an equal distribu-
tion among the branches of his family. 5
JoN F. OSTER
Implied Warranty Extending To Persons Not In
Privity Of Contract With 'Seller
Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc.'
An infant driver of an automobile brought an action
for breach of the implied warranty of merchantibility,2
by next friend, for breach of the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose,3 and for negligence. The
action was against the Ford Motor Company, the manu-
facturer of the automobile, and Hackensack Auto Sales,
Inc., the dealer selling the automobile, for personal in-
2The English courts thought that the word "equally" indicated the
testator's intention that the distributees should hold the estate as 'tenants
in common. Id., 259-260. In Maryland the word "equally" has been held
to signify the testator's intention that there be a per capita distribution.
See Alexander v. Keplinger, 62 Md. 7 (1884).
1 See 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 50, § 9; Williams v. Dovell, 202 Md. 351,
358, 96 A. 2d 484 (1953).
See Comment, Wills-Construction-Meaning of "Issue" in Testamentary
Gifts, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 630, 632 (1939).
See Schnebly, Testamentary Gifts to "Issue", 35 Yale L.J. 571, 592
(1926).
163 N.J. Super. 476, 164 A. 2d 773 (1960).
2N.J.S.A. 46: 30-20; similar provision found in 7 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 83, § 33(2).
8N.J.S.A. 46: 30-21(1) ; similar provision found in 7 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 83, § 33(1).
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